Transition of the conception of knowledge: from Descartes to Reid by Toda, Takefumi
Title Transition of the conception of knowledge: from Descartes toReid
Author(s)Toda, Takefumi








Transition of the Conception of Knowledge: 
From Descartes to Reid(l) 
Takefumi Toda 
In this paper, I discuss the conception of knowledge in modern philosophy. I will not 
analyze it through the entire course of modern philosophy but instead focus partiCUlarly on 
British empiricists. I will then describe how changes in the conception of knowledge occurred 
during this period by the introduction of psychological considerations into the epistemology. 
I. Pre-British empiricists: Descartes 
Before focusing on British empiricists, we must pay some attention to Descartes. 
Descartes is undoubtedly one of the founders of modern epistemology. As is well known, he 
tried to overturn the scholastic philosophy by laying a solid foundation. In doing so, he 
initiated the notion of methodological skepticism; that is, he decided to question everything 
that had even the slightest reason to be doubted. He explicitly expresses this decision as 
follows. 
[B]ut as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a 
procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false 
all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to 
ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly 
indubitable. (2) 
Today, this position is known as foundationalism. Descartes' foundational ism has an 
important feature: the foundation of our system of knowledge must be such that it rejects all 
possible doubts. That is, it must have certainty. In other words, if there is even the slightest 
doubt-even if it has 99.999% reliability-it does not deserve to be considered as the 
foundation of our knowledge system. 
It is certain that Descartes tried to reform our system of knowledge or science, but 
notwithstanding his trial, there may have been some things that he did not question. (3) This is 
the conception of knowledge. To treat knowledge as having certainty has been a tradition of 
philosophy since the Greek era, when knowledge was called episteme (emo'tI111I)) and was 
differentiated from opinion (80~a). This tradition continues even today, albeit with 
modifications. 
Even if Descartes accepts the conception of knowledge at face value without doubting it 
(since we assume that he should question anything that raises doubt), he may not have to be 
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blamed for doing so. Of course, this will cast serious doubts on the success of his project. 
However, in this paper, I will not enter that debate. At this juncture, being able to identify his 
conception of knowledge will suffice. 
H. Locke 
Next, we proceed to Locke. Similar to Descartes, he was an eminent philosopher as well 
as a scientist. It is well known that he was a physicist and was said to have been an assistant to 
Robert Boyle. Like many other thinkers during this period, Locke was influenced by 
Descartes. However, with regard to epistemology, he seemed to take a very different stance. 
As mentioned above, Descartes took a rigid stance on foundationalism; he believed that 
the foundation of our scientific or knowledge system must have certainty. Locke, however, did 
not follow Descartes' line of belief. He did not seek a firm foundation for a knowledge system 
as Descartes did. Rather, he took the then scientific theory for granted. This theory, the so-
called corpuscular hypothesis, explains various events in terms of minute particles or atoms. 
According to this theory, our world consists of particles, and it is the inherent qualities of these 
particles that help us create perceptions about the external world. Following Descartes, Locke 
called these perceptions "ideas." Descartes considered some ideas as innate, but Locke rejected 
innate ideas and believed that all ideas were generated through experience. (4) This belief is the 
reason that Locke is considered to be the founder of British empiricism. 
Locke said that our knowledge was composed of such ideas. However, it would be 
incorrect to assume that his epistemology is completely grounded on his adoption of the 
corpuscular hypothesis. If we go by this supposition, then we will be led to regard his 
conception of knowledge as not having cel1ainty, which is not the case. To ascertain this point, 
we must examine his conception of knowledge in greater detail. 
Locke evolved his conception of knowledge in Book IV of his Essay, where he describes 
knowledge as follows. 
Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and 
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. 
Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may 
fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come ShOl1 of knowledge. For when we know that 
white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When 
we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles 
of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to 
two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from, the three angles of a 
triangle. (5) 
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Moreover, he classifies these perceptions of agreement or disagreement of ideas under 
four groups: (1) identity or diversity, (2) relation, (3) co-existence or necessary connexion, 
and (4) real existence. The fourth, real existence, may seem problematic at first glance. Ifwe 
want to understand the reality of our ideas, analyzing our ideas alone would be insufficient. 
But the other three groups do not pose any such problems. To have perceptions, we have to 
come up with two or more ideas. Metaphorically speaking, perception from the first group to 
the third is horizontal. We can even say that if our knowledge depends on the horizontal 
perception of ideas, then Locke's conception of knowledge (except for that about real 
existence) is irrelevant to the corpuscular hypothesis, for we can compare our ideas, whatever 
causes they may have, and all we need for comparing them is some phenomena, which are 
called ideas by the corpuscular hypothesis. 
With the above definition, Locke believed that he found a means to ascertain some types 
of knowledge, that is, moral knowledge or mathematical knowledge. We can obtain this 
knowledge by comparing ideas and apprehending their relations. By defining knowledge in 
this manner, he devised means to eliminate uncertainty in acquired knowledge. 
The above explanation of Locke's epistemology shows that Locke took over the Cartesian 
conception of knowledge, in which it is thought necessary to have certainty. To elaborate on 
this point, we must take a look at his words about the essence of external bodies, given in book 
N. The following is an example. 
Judgment of probability concerning substances may reach further: but that is not 
knowledge. We are not therefore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few general 
propositions made concerning substances: our knowledge of their qualities and properties 
goes very seldom further than our senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and 
observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken 
from wary observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience 
has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, 
and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge. (6) 
I think our common sense makes us take it for granted that we know the various qualities 
of external objects through our senses. This was not the case for Locke. The beliefs we form 
about external objects through our senses are merely opinions and not knowledge. Locke, we 
may say, agrees with Descartes on the conception of knowledge, though Locke began his 
philosophy from a perspective that was very different from that of Descartes. At the same time, 
we can stress on the differences between the two. Though Locke does not regard some of the 
information obtained through sensation as knowledge, he evaluates its importance well; 
moreover, he finds the function performed by our senses to be sufficient. The common factor 
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between him and the British empiricists after him was that they highly evaluated the beliefs 
formed through our senses. These empiricists further developed Locke's theories on 
sensation. (7) 
HI. Berkeley 
In this section, I discuss Berkeley. He is an important figure for this paper, for I think it is 
he who was responsible for the radical change in the conception of knowledge. 
His attack on Locke is known as a defense against skepticism, which stems from 
materialism. That is, he tried to secure our knowledge of sensation by bringing all material 
objects into the mental objects. What I consider more important is that his argument triggered 
a change in the conception of knowledge, though this point is rarely mentioned. As we saw in 
the previous section, Locke maintained the traditional or Cartesian conception of knowledge, 
but it was subsequently transformed by Berkeley. 
In another paper, I analyzed the change in the conception of the "immediacy of 
perception" in the modem period. (8) Additionally, I pointed out that Berkeley blurred this 
conception by introducing a psychological explanation about how we perceive the outer world 
with our own eyes. Once again, I will briefly highlight this point. 
In New Theory of Vision, Berkeley explains how eyes perceive distance. He stresses the 
heterogeneity of visual and tactual objects. When we see certain objects at a distance, the first 
thing we notice is their color; in contrast, for objects at a close range, our tactile senses playa 
greater role (NTV 108). However, when we see a visual object, tactual objects that we 
consider to be associated with the visual object are suggested to our minds. As a result, we 
perceive some bodies as individuals. Therefore, our conception of objects is based on both 
immediate objects, perceived with the eyes, and mediate objects, perceived through touch. 
Berkeley insists that he changes material bodies into ideas, and by doing so, makes it possible 
for us to have immediate access to material bodies. Regardless of his intention, by introducing 
a psychological process into his theory, he indicates that he bases perceptions of external 
bodies on both immediate and mediate stimuli; thus, he blurred the conception of immediacy. 
The above interpretation of immediate perception in Berkeley's epistemology is in 
accordance with his conception of knowledge. Though Berkeley, unlike Locke, wants t9 secure 
our sense-based knowledge, it is not sufficient to merely convert external bodies into ideas. 
The immediacy of perception cannot establish the certainty of our sense-based knowledge 
because it is threatened by the inductive property of our experience, which is exactly why 
Hume attacked the traditional conception of knowledge. Berkeley hardly mentioned this 
problem, but I do not think that it is probably because he did not notice it to begin with. Rather, 
I think he chose to put greater confidence into the regularity of our experience which 
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demonstrates the benevolence of our Maker. At the same time, he chose to expand our 
conception of knowledge. My interpretation places Berkeley into a type of reliabilist camp in 
epistemology. According to Berkeley, the connection between visual and tactual experiences 
indicates a type of natural law. He also says that we should be able to connect them by means 
of a faculty called "suggestion," which our Maker has furnished us with. Hence, the process of 
this transition from visual experience to tactual experience should be made reliable by both 
natural course and our constitution, which ultimately are derived from the benevolence of our 
Maker. If we are able to obtain some perceptual beliefs by reliable processes, we should 
consider them justified. This is the central thesis of reliabilism, and my interpretation is that 
this thesis is also found in Berkeley's philosophy, although he did not fully develop this 
epistemology. 
This is why I mention Berkeley's enterprise as expanding the conception of knowledge. 
To regard knowledge as a justified belief is not equivalent to regarding it as having certainty. 
Rather, to do so is to destroy the traditional conception of knowledge and thus make Timaeus 
victorious against Socrates. 
IV. Hume and Reid 
In the previous section, I showed the collapse of the traditional conception of knowledge 
that occurred when Berkeley introduced physiology into the evaluation of our epistemic status. 
After him, British philosophers, whether consciously or unconsciously, developed 
epistemology along his lines. In this section, I briefly touch upon Hume's argument and then 
delve into his opponent Reid's argument in greater detail. 
At one time, Hume's epistemology was paid much attention by virtue of its skeptical 
aspect, and his epistemology was believed to have destroyed the conception of knowledge. 
Nowadays, however, many scholars have come to estimate its constructive aspect. 
Hume asserts that it is impossible for us to obtain the kind of knowledge that Descartes 
sought, that is, knowledge that can escape all doubts. His arguments cover several aspects, for 
example, causality, the existence of an outer world, or an identity of the self. Considering 
causality, for instance, we are inclined to believe that event A is a cause of event B if A has 
always been followed by B, but such belief is only attained by habit, which does not guarantee 
that the same event will occur in the future. In other words, our belief about causality does not 
escape doubt even if its reliability is very high. As a result, Hume admits that he himself is 
something of a skeptic, though his skepticism tends to be moderate rather than radical. (9) 
It is certain that his skepticism led to the destruction of knowledge, but only if we consider 
this "knowledge" from a Cartesian or traditional perspective. To reiterate, only if we adopt 
such a stance can Hume's epistemology prove to be destructive. However, as mentioned above, 
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the destruction of the traditional conception of knowledge has already begun. We can regard 
Hume as a successor of this enterprise. Hume's intention was not to destroy knowledge but 
rather to soften the conception of knowledge. I know that many thinkers today have already 
asserted this point. This interpretation illuminates the constructive aspect of Hume's 
epistemology. 
Hume's arguments share certain features with Berkeley's. As already mentioned, Hume 
also explains our epistemic status by shedding light on our psychological status; this 
explanation prompted people to name him a pioneer of associationism. Incorporating 
psychology into epistemology helped both Berkeley and Hume to reconstruct the conception 
of knowledge. 
It was Thomas Reid who advanced Hume's epistemology even though he was Hume's 
contemporary. However, Reid did not do this intentionally. Reid regarded Hume's 
epistemology as constituting skepticism and considered himself to be Hume's toughest 
opponent. While there is no doubt that their arguments on epistemology have rather different 
tones, I am of the opinion that their differences are really two sides of the same coin. Their 
differences lie not in the substance of their argument but rather in the point that each one 
wished to stress upon. To explain this a little better, I must take a closer look at Reid's 
epistemology. 
Reid was anxious to defend our knowledge against skepticism. Yet, he did not find a way 
to defend the traditional conception of knowledge. He was a first-rank philosopher as well as a 
psychologist at that time. Along with Berkeley, he introduced a psychological consideration 
into his epistemology, which Locke, for example, tried to avoid. (10) According to Reid, the 
link between us and the external world consists of multiple stages. The initial parts of their 
stages are physical, and the subsequent stages are mental. The former consist of stimuli 
received by the body and then the transmission of these stimuli to the brain through the 
nervous system. The stimuli received by the brain produce a sensation in the mind. The mental 
process begins when this sensation occurs. The sensation then suggests some concept of the 
external object to the mind and produces a belief of its existence; Reid terms their occurrence 
as "perception." Reid's explanation for this process is so perplexing that, even today, many 
scholars are still attempting to understand it. (11) In the paper, I will pass over this discussion. 
Instead, I would like to stress on the fact that Reid assimilates with Berkeley by introducing 
mental processes into epistemology. Though Reid calls himself a defender of the concept of 
the immediacy of perception, that concept has already changed, compared with Descartes, 
Locke, or Hume. These philosophers' conception of immediate perception is acquaintance, if 
we can use Russell's terminology. (12) I pointed this out in my earlier paper as well as in the 
present paper, in the section on Berkeley. Like I mentioned in my earlier paper, the change in 
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the conception of the immediacy of perception led to a change in the conception of knowledge. 
For many philosophers, the immediacy of perception as acquaintance guarantees our beliefs 
brought through sensation as knowledge. (3) However, according to Reid, whose explanation 
matched Berkeley's, the immediacy of perception cannot guarantee them by itself. (4) Rather, 
our knowledge is formed through our reliance on our constitution or our inherent nature. Reid 
expresses one reliable aspect of our nature, that is, common sense. By doing so, Reid and 
Berkeley tried to secure the beliefs that we form through sensation as knowledge. Earlier, I 
posited Berkeley as a re1iabilist; at this juncture, I think we can say the same thing about 
Reid. (5) 
I had mentioned earlier that Reid and Hume were two sides of the same coin. My 
reasoning behind this assertion is explained in the next paragraph. Hume examined the 
possibility of a traditional conception of knowledge and, as a result, repudiated his previous 
stance. Instead he showed that we must have recourse to our nature even if we do not attain 
certainty with regard to our beliefs, because he thought that we must not adopt absolute 
skepticism. 
My theory is that the conception of knowledge went from an absolutist theory to a 
reliabilist one. Moreover, it was argued that this transition was prompted by the introduction of 
a psychological or physiological consideration into epistemology. We might even call it the 
transition from epistemology to psychology. Of course, these words should not be taken 
literally. Quoting the famous words of W. V. O. Quine, this transition can be described as "the 
naturalization of epistemology." (16) As another example, I refer to David Hartley, who was 
also a physiologist and philosopher of this age. 
Hartley's main interest lay in how our thought or conduct can be attained on a 
physiological basis. He was particularly influenced by Newton and philosophers who preceded 
him, such as Hobbs, Locke, and Berkeley. (7) His theOlY was vigorously attacked by Reid, 
who considered Hartley's theory to be only a groundless hypothesis; his attack seemed to have 
missed the mark, for Hartley embraced a peculiar view of knowledge. His conception of 
knowledge was much softer than that of any other thinker at that time. Hartley recognized that 
his theory was grounded on a hypothesis; on the other hand, he seemed to have understood the 
importance of the role that hypotheses play in the advancement of scientific knowledge. 
Hartley tries to attribute the vibration in our nerves and medullary substances to ether. He 
then assumes the existence of ether, while at the same time recognizing that we do not have 
direct evidence of its existence; as a result, this existence can be supposed only by hypothesis. 
However, he explains the usefulness of the hypothesis through the example of cipher. 
And as the false and imperfect keys, which tum up to the decipherer of the true and 
complete one, so any hypothesis that has so much plausibility, as to explain a considerable 
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number of facts, helps us to digest these facts in proper order, to bring new ones to light, 
and to make Experimenta Crucis for the sake of the future inquirers. The rule of false 
affords an obvious and strong instance of the possibility of being led, with precision and 
certainty to a true conclusion from a false position; and it is of the very essence of algebra 
to proceed in the way of supposition. (Hartley, 179l. 16) 
The above words express his soft conception of knowledge. Though his ultimate aim was 
to establish the intellectual and moral aspects of man, his book is widely devoted to the 
consideration of the psychological aspects of our sensations. This point brings out his attitude 
as a physiologist. As mentioned above, he was influenced by Newton or Berkeley; moreover, 
what influenced Hartley about Berkeley was not his immaterialism but rather his psychological 
consideration about vision. These points show that when science or psychology penetrates 
philosophy, our conception is softened. But why is conception of knowledge softened by 
psychology penetrating epistemology? Of course, the general answer to this question may not 
exist. Answering this question, even for contemporary times, will involve a very detailed 
examination, which is not within the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, one possible 
answer that I can offer is that epistemology penetrated by psychology serves not only a 
theoretical purpose but also a practical one. I will touch upon this briefly and then conclude 
the paper. 
In this age, science-as defined in today's terminology-made remarkable advances. Its 
rapid growth also accelerated the growth of technology, especially visual technology. 
Numerous optical instruments were contrived, and the study of our visual systems flourished. 
These developments naturally call attention to the application of the principles of science to 
everyday life. Health and medicine in particular were important concerns. Descartes believed 
medical studies to be the most applied science and placed them at the top of the tree of 
knowledge. When Berkeley published his New Theory of Vision, there were great debates on 
our visual systems. Many philosophers tried to resolve these problems through metaphysics; 
however, the theories and principles thus proposed also carne under debate, and therefore, the 
foundation of applied sciences was never settled. Nevertheless, applied sciences were a major 
priority for many thinkers. I would attribute one reason for this to the immediate effect of 
applied sciences, particularly medical science, on our everyday lives and to their social 
demand, even if they may have not always proved beneficial. Moreover, in spite of numerous 
theories proposed by philosophers, these sciences need not necessarily be based on 
metaphysics. That is, applied sciences may need some theoretical foundations or 
considerations, which need not necessarily be rooted in metaphysics. 
Even though I have stated that social factors are responsible for the change in the 
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conception of knowledge, I do not deny that there could be some purely theoretical reasons as 
well. For example, Goodwin, a psychologist, asserts the following about the importance of 
Berkeley's works in the history of psychology. 
Once the problem of human knowledge became a psychological one, people began asking 
different questions. Rather than asking a philosophical question like "How much can be 
known about the nature of reality?" thinkers now began asking questions like "Just exactly 
how does visual perception work to enhance what we know?" This shift would eventually 
bring about a scientific psychology. (18) 
I believe that this theoretical factor in combination with the social factor brought about the 
change in the conception of knowledge. These factors cannot be clearly distinguished. 
If my assumption be valid, these points suggest that modem epistemology took on certain 
aspects of naturalized epistemology, and I firmly believe that it did. However, it does not 
appear to have remained constant following this period. Subsequently, Gennany became the 
prime base for epistemology, where it was newly developed as Gennan idealism. I believe that 
the reasons why the modem epistemology-especially that of British empiricists-failed to 
evolve into naturalism in a straightforward manner are worth considering; unfortunately, it is 
not within the scope of this paper to explore the reasons. 
Here, it is important to turn to historical recurrences. In the twentieth century, 
epistemology seems to have taken the same course as in the modem era. In the early twentieth 
century, although British empiricists influenced the sense-datum theory to some degree, sense-
datum theorists had a conception of knowledge that was the same or at least similar to the 
traditional, strong conception of knowledge supported by Descartes. Therefore they sought to 
establish an absolute foundation of knowledge. Epistemology in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, however, turned to the principles of naturalized epistemology, which eventually 
softened the conception of knowledge once again. For example, Quine is one of the most 
influential leaders in this movement. Other philosophers such as Goldman or Churchland also 
concentrate on the psychological process in epistemology rather than on the pursuit of 
certainty in knowledge. (19) In the words of Phillip Kitcher(20), the modem movement is 'the 
naturalism return' of the modem epistemology. (21) Why did such a "return" occur? Or what is 
the difference between the two? If there are differences, what prompted them? It is worthwhile 
considering such questions in order to understand our era. However, since these questions are 
beyond the scope of this paper, I leave them unanswered for the moment. 
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Transition of the Conception of Knowledge: 
From Descartes to Reid 
Takefumi Toda 
In this paper, I discuss the conception of knowledge in modern philosophy. I will not 
analyze it through the entire course of modern philosophy but instead focus particularly on 
British empiricists. I will then describe how changes in the conception of knowledge occurred 
during this period by the introduction of psychological considerations into the epistemology. 
In modern philosophy Descartes held the strong conception of knowledge which implied 
certainty. According to this conception, if our beliefs accept the lowest dubiousness, we cannot 
consider them as knowledge. Descartes tried to develop his whole epistemic system by means 
of this conception. John Locke, the founder of British empiricism, took over this conception 
from Descartes. Though Locke, unlike Descartes, seems not to have taken uncertainty of our 
beliefs seriously, he distinguished knowledge from opinion, which was the belief which did 
not have certainty. 
I argue that this conception of knowledge changed gradually after Locke. His follower, 
Berkeley, explicated our perceptual process of vision and introduced it into his epistemology. I 
think his argument is a sign of the change of epistemology. Many thinkers and scientists came 
to pay attention to our physiological system of knowledge-generation. In the other words, their 
concern about what was knowledge shifted to how our knowledge was generated. My main 
point is that the conception of knowledge was softened with that change. And then, I point out 
that this change was the naturalization of epistemology in modern period. 
(Associate professor of Kyoto University) 
